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The Rise of Far-Right Populism (Part 2): Why Is Populism on the Rise

Writer: Ben Landricombe
Ben Landricombe
Oct 11
4 min read

In the last edition of TIG, we examined the origins of populism and its significant rise across Europe over the past 15 years.

In this edition, we will aim to break down the socioeconomic factors that drive populism and explain its fundamental causes.


Economy

Our last edition ended with a brief discussion on economic instability and the stagnation of European economies following the 2008 financial crash. Stagnation in productivity, complex trade barriers, and volatile global markets have severely constrained economic growth among Europe's largest nations.


EconFact reported that the EU saw growth of 13.5% (from $16.37 trillion to $18.59 trillion) compared to US growth of 87% (from $14.77 trillion to $27.72 trillion). Accounting for population, EU GDP per capita fell from 76% of US GDP per capita in 2008 to 50% in 2023.

This lethargic growth has direct implications for Europeans across the continent. According to a EuroNews survey, 29% of EU citizens believe their lives will become more difficult in the next 5 years, with a peak of 44% of adults in France reporting a negative outlook. This pervasive anxiety has been fueled by post-pandemic economic troughs, the Russia–Ukraine war, and ongoing energy volatility originating in the Middle East.


Stagnated growth has led to citizens feeling squashed by limited wage expansion and increases in the cost of living. Couple this with issues of unequal development, regional decline, varying levels of corruption, and struggling established political parties, and it creates a fertile ground for populist groups. Populist parties can weaponise economic anxieties, blaming existing parties and the government, which gives them the ability to call for radical change.

For disengaged voters who face a harsher economic climate, the promise of change and the displacement of parties that have failed them seem appealing, resulting in populist parties gaining significant ground.


Repetitive economic failures have been a driver of deep distrust within existing political systems across Europe. The University of Southampton found that trust in democratic institutions has been falling globally, with the UK seeing a steady fall since 1990, although there was a slight rise around the time of the Brexit referendum.


Trends in trust in six institutions from global models (only including democracies) - University Of Southampton
Trends in trust in six institutions from global models (only including democracies) - University Of Southampton

This distrust leads many voters to believe that despite ideological differences, many parties produce similar outcomes that fail to address everyday problems. This, connected with high-profile political scandals, corporate lobbying, and institutional inertia, feeds a narrative that elected officials do not care about ordinary citizens.


Successful populist parties are able to harness this erosion of trust, offering simple, decisive solutions to voters who feel abandoned by mainstream politics.


Culture

Another argument as to why populist parties have grown considerably over the past decade is a significant cultural shift.

Immigration has been at the forefront of political discussion among Europe's most dominant countries. According to YouGov, it ranks as the largest issue for Britons, the second-largest in Spain, France, Germany, and Denmark, and the third-largest in Italy. Immigration is the only issue that ranks in the top 3 for all 6 countries.


Immigration is a consistent point of attack for Europe's most prominent far-right populist parties. Many are taking a hard line on the issue to court voters: Reform UK and France's National Rally, for instance, have made immigration central to their platforms. Germany's AfD, which recently saw strong results in Saxony-Anhalt, offers a clear example. Its immigration policy includes a segregated education system for asylum seekers' children, highly restrictive immigration requirements, and rapid, mass deportations carried out under what the party calls "remigration."


This leads to the question of why immigration is such a point of contention.


From a public expenditure standpoint, the numbers are often lower than rhetoric suggests. The German government spends 0.6% of GDP on asylum-related costs, and net immigration has more than halved from its 2022 peak. The same trend is visible elsewhere: the UK spends just 0.14% of GDP on immigration, overall immigration has fallen since 2023, Channel crossings are down from their peak, and the number of hotels used for asylum accommodation now sits at around 160, down from a peak of 400.


There is certainly an argument that immigration has a fiscal cost; however, it can also be argued that the discourse around immigration concerns issues of culture and religion, not purely the direct cost to the taxpayer.


Far-right populist groups have gained significant traction by framing their messaging around these cultural concerns. In the UK, the Reform Party has continued to integrate Christian practices into its policy positions. Zia Yusuf, Reform UK's spokesperson for Home Affairs, has stated that the party would introduce a new school curriculum with Christian values “at its heart”.

Reform UK has also been accused of stoking religious divides. Zia Yusuf recently condemned the Labour appointment of candidate Sagal Abdi-Wali in the Holborn and St Pancras by-election based on her religion and race.


Far-right populists have been blamed for weaponizing religion and cultural divides by creating a culture of "them vs. us," offering social groups that can be blamed for a range of societal issues.


This "them vs. us" narrative is particularly successful as it plays on cultural and economic anxieties that are rife within Western European societies. Its success can be summed up through the use of Social Identity Theory. Proposed by Tajfel and Turner, it suggests that people derive self-esteem through group membership, favouring "in-groups" over "threatening" "out-groups." Creating these narratives through the weaponisation of nationalist symbolism manufactures a shared in-group identity, allowing populist parties to channel economic and cultural anxieties into direct public support.


Populist parties continue to grow across European political systems and will continue to do so if key economic and cultural divisions remain a key point of public discourse.


 
 
 

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